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Abstract
We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who,
in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary prefer-
ences, which govern their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election out-
come. Specifically, we study two models that have been recently considered in the
literature [6, 17]: lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when they are not pivotal, and
truth-biased voters, who prefer to vote truthfully when they are not pivotal. We ex-
tend prior work by investigating the behavior of both lazy and truth-biased voters
under different tie-breaking rules (lexicographic rule, random voter rule, random
candidate rule). Two of these six combinations of secondary preferences and a tie-
breaking rule have been studied in prior work. In order to understand the impact
of different secondary preferences and tie-breaking rules on the election outcomes,
we study the remaining four combinations. We characterize pure Nash equilibria
(PNE) of the resulting strategic games and study the complexity of related compu-
tational problems. Our results extend to settings where some of the voters may be
non-strategic.
1 Introduction
Plurality voting is a popular tool for collective decision-making in many domains, in-
cluding both human societies and multiagent systems. Under this voting rule, each
voter is supposed to vote for her most favorite candidate (or abstain); the winner is
then the candidate that receives the highest number of votes. If several candidates have
the highest score, the winner is chosen among them using a tie-breaking rule; popular
tie-breaking rules include the lexicographic rule, which imposes a fixed priority order
over the candidates; the random candidate rule, which picks one of the tied candidates
uniformly at random; and the random voter rule, which picks the winner among the
tied candidates according to the preferences of a randomly chosen voter.
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In practice, voters are often strategic, i.e., they may vote non-truthfully if they can
benefit from doing so. In that case, an election can be viewed as a game, where the
voters are the players, and each player’s space of actions includes voting for any can-
didate or abstaining. For deterministic rules (such as Plurality with lexicographic tie-
breaking), the behavior of strategic voters is determined by their preference ordering,
i.e., a ranking of the candidates, whereas for randomized rules a common approach is
to specify utility functions for the voters; i.e., the voters are assumed to maximize their
expected utility under the lottery induced by tie-breaking. The outcome of the election
can then be identified with a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the resulting game.
However, for the Plurality voting game with 3 or more voters, this approach fails
to provide a useful prediction of voting behavior: for each candidate c there is a PNE
where c is the unique winner, irrespective of the voters’ preferences. Indeed, if there
are at least 3 voters, the situation where all of them vote for c is a PNE, as no voter can
unilaterally change the election outcome. However, such equilibria may disappear if
we use a more refined model of voters’ preferences that captures additional aspects of
their decision-making. For instance, in practice, if a voter feels that her vote is unlikely
to have any effect on the election outcome, she may decide to abstain from the election.
Also, voters may be averse to lying about their preferences, in which case they can be
expected to vote for their top candidate unless there is a clear strategic reason to vote for
someone else. By taking into account these aspects of voters’ preferences, we obtain a
more faithful model of their behavior.
The problem of characterizing and computing the equilibria of Plurality voting,
both for “lazy” voters (i.e., ones who prefer to abstain when they are not pivotal) and for
“truth-biased” voters (ones who prefer to vote truthfully when they are not pivotal), has
recently received a considerable amount of attention. However, it is difficult to compare
the existing results, since they rely on different tie-breaking rules. In particular, [6],
who study lazy voters, use the random candidate tie-breaking rule, and [17] consider
truth-biased voters and the lexicographic tie-breaking rule. Thus, it is not clear whether
the differences between the results in these papers can be attributed to voters’ secondary
preferences or to the tie-breaking rule.
The primary goal of our paper is to tease out the effects of different features of these
models, by systematically considering various combinations of secondary preferences
and tie-breaking rules. We consider two types of secondary preferences (lazy voters
and truth-biased voters) and three tie-breaking rules (the lexicographic rule, the ran-
dom voter rule, and the random candidate rule); while two of these combinations have
been studied earlier by Desmedt and Elkind [6] and Obraztsova et al. [17], to the best
of our knowledge, the remaining four possibilities have not been considered before.
For each of the new scenarios, we characterize the set of PNE for the resulting game;
in doing so, we also fill in a gap in the characterization of Desmedt and Elkind for lazy
voters and random candidate tie-breaking. We then consider the problems of decid-
ing whether a given game admits a PNE and whether a given candidate can be a co-
winner/unique winner in some PNE of a given game. For all settings we consider, we
determine the computational complexity of each of these problems, classifying them as
either polynomial-time solvable or NP-complete. We use our characterization results
to analyze the impact of various features of our models on the election outcomes. Fi-
nally, we extend our results to the setting where some of the voters may be principled,
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i.e., are guaranteed to vote truthfully.
Related Work
Equilibria of Plurality voting have been investigated by a number of researchers,
starting with [9]. However, most of the earlier works either consider solution con-
cepts other than pure Nash equilibria, such as iterative elimination of dominated strate-
gies [13, 7], or assume that voters have incomplete information about each others’
preferences [14]. Both types of secondary preferences (lazy voters and truth-biased
voters) appear in the social choice literature, see, respectively, [2, 3, 19] and [8, 11].
In computational social choice, truth-biased voters have been considered by Meir et
al. [12] in the context of dynamics of Plurality voting; subsequently, Plurality elections
with truth-biased voters have been investigated empirically by Thompson et al. [20] and
theoretically by Obraztsova et al. [17]. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper to
study computational aspects of Plurality voting with lazy voters is that of Desmedt and
Elkind [6].
Our approach to tie-breaking is well-grounded in existing works. Lexicographic
tie-breaking is standard in the computational social choice literature. The random can-
didate rule has been discussed by Desmedt and Elkind [6], and, more recently, by
Obraztsova, Elkind and Hazon [16] and Obraztsova and Elkind [15]. The random voter
rule is used to break ties under the Schulze method [18]; complexity of manipulation
under this tie-breaking rule has been studied by Aziz et al. [1].
2 Preliminaries
For any positive integer t, we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t]. We consider elections
with a set of voters N = [n] and a set of alternatives, or candidates,C = {c1, . . . cm}.
Each voter is associated with a preference order, i.e., a strict linear order over C; we
denote the preference order of voter i by ≻i. The list (≻1, . . . ,≻n) is called a pref-
erence profile. For each i ∈ N , we set ai to be the top choice of voter i, and let
a = (a1, . . . , an). Given two disjoint sets of candidates X , Y and a preference order
≻, we write X ≻ Y if in≻ all candidates fromX are ranked above all candidates from
Y .
We also assume that each voter i ∈ N is endowed with a utility function ui :
C → N; ui(cj) is the utility derived by voter i if cj is the unique election winner.
We require that ui(c) 6= ui(c′) for all i ∈ N and all c, c′ ∈ C such that c 6= c′.
The vector u = (u1, . . . , un) is called the utility profile. Voters’ preference orders
and utility functions are assumed to be consistent, i.e., for each i ∈ N and every pair
of candidates c, c′ ∈ C we have c ≻i c′ if and only if ui(c) > ui(c′); when this is
the case, we will also say that ≻i is induced by ui. Sometimes, instead of specifying
preference orders explicitly, we will specify the utility functions only, and assume that
voters’ preference orders are induced by their utility functions; on other occasions, it
will be convenient to reason in terms of preference orders.
A lottery over C is a vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) with pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m] and∑
j∈[m] pj = 1. The value pj is the probability assigned to candidate cj . The expected
utility of a voter i ∈ N from a lottery p is given by
∑
j∈[m] ui(cj)pj .
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In this paper we consider Plurality elections. In such elections each voter i ∈ N
submits a vote, or ballot, bi ∈ C ∪ {⊥}; if bi = ⊥, voter i is said to abstain. The
list of all votes b = (b1, . . . , bn) is also called a ballot vector. We say that a ballot
vector is trivial if bi = ⊥ for all i ∈ N . Given a ballot vector b and a ballot b′, we
write (b−i, b′) to denote the ballot vector obtained from b by replacing bi with b′. The
score of an alternative cj in an election with ballot vector b is given by sc(cj ,b) =
|{i ∈ N | bi = cj}|. Given a ballot vector b, we set M(b) = maxc∈C sc(c,b) and
let W (b) = {c ∈ C | sc(c,b) = M(b)}, H(b) = {c ∈ C | sc(c,b) = M(b) − 1},
H ′(b) = {c ∈ C | sc(c,b) = M(b) − 2}. The set W (b) is called the winning set.
Note that if b is trivial then W (b) = C. If |W (b)| = 1 then the unique candidate
in W (b) is declared to be the winner. Otherwise, the winner is selected from W (b)
according to one of the following tie-breaking rules.
(1) Under the lexicographic rule RL, the winner is the candidate cj ∈ W (b) such
that j ≤ k for all ck ∈W (b).
(2) Under the random candidate rule RC , the winner is chosen from W (b) uni-
formly at random.
(3) Under the random voter rule RV , we select a voter fromN uniformly at random;
if she has voted for a candidate in W (b), we output this candidate, otherwise we
ask this voter to report her most preferred candidate in W (b), and output the
answer. This additional elicitation step may appear difficult to implement in
practice; fortunately, we can show that, in equilibrium it is almost never neces-
sary.
Thus, the outcome of an election is a lottery over C; however, for RL this lottery is
degenerate, i.e., it always assigns the entire probability mass to a single candidate.
For each X ∈ {L,C, V } and each ballot vector b, let pX(b) denote the lottery that
corresponds to applying RX to the set W (b). Note also that for every cj ∈ C it holds
that if pCj (b) 6= 0 then pCj (b) ≥ 1m ; similarly, if p
V
j (b) 6= 0 then pVj (b) ≥ 1n .
In what follows, we consider lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when their vote
has no effect on the election outcome, and truth-biased voters, who never abstain,
but prefer to vote truthfully when their vote has no effect on the election outcome.
Formally, pick ε < min{ 1
m
, 1
n
}, and consider a utility profile u and a tie-breaking rule
RX ∈ {RC , RV , RL}. Then
• if voter i is lazy, her utility in an election with ballot vector b under tie-breaking
rule RX is given by
Ui(b) =
{∑
j∈[m] p
X
j (b)ui(cj) if bi ∈ C,∑
j∈[m] p
X
j (b)ui(cj) + ε if bi = ⊥.
• if voter i is truth-biased, her utility in an election with ballot vector b under
tie-breaking rule RX is given by
Ui(b) =


∑
j∈[m] p
X
j (b)ui(cj) if bi ∈ C \ {ai},∑
j∈[m] p
X
j (b)ui(cj) + ε if bi = ai,
−∞ if bi = ⊥.
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We consider settings where all voters are of the same type, i.e., either all voters are
lazy or all voters are truth-biased; we refer to these settings as lazy or truth-biased,
respectively, and denote the former by L and the latter by T .
In what follows, we consider all possible combinations of settings (L, T ) and tie-
breaking rules (RL, RC , RV ). A combination of a setting S ∈ {L, T }, a tie-breaking
rule R ∈ {RL, RC , RV } and a utility profile u induces a strategic game, which we
will denote by (S, R,u): in this game, the players are the voters, the action space of
each player is C ∪ {⊥}, and the players’ utilities U1, . . . , Un for a vector of actions
b are computed based on the setting and the tie-breaking rule as described above. We
say that a ballot vector b is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the game (S, R,u) if
Ui(b) ≥ Ui(b−i, b′) for every voter i ∈ N and every b′ ∈ C ∪ {⊥}.
For each setting S ∈ {L, T } and each tie-breaking rule R ∈ {RL, RC , RV }, we
define three algorithmic problems, which we call (S, R)-EXISTNE, (S, R)-TIENE,
and (S, R)-SINGLENE. In each of these problems, we are given a candidate set C,
|C| = m, a voter set N , |N | = n, and a utility vector u = (u1, . . . , un), where each ui
is represented by m numbers ui(c1), . . . , ui(cm); these numbers are positive integers
given in binary. In (S, R)-TIENE and (S, R)-SINGLENE we are also given the name
of a target candidate cp ∈ C. In (S, R)-EXISTNE we ask if (S, R,u) has a PNE. In
(S, R)-TIENE we ask if (S, R,u) has a PNE b with |W (b)| > 1 and cp ∈ W (b).
In (S, R)-SINGLENE we ask if (S, R,u) has a PNE b with W (b) = {cp}. Each of
these problems is obviously in NP, as we can simply guess an appropriate ballot vector
b and check that it is a PNE.
We omit some of the proofs due to space constraints; these proofs can be found in
the supplementary material.
3 Lazy Voters
In this section, we study PNE in Plurality games with lazy voters. The case where the
tie-breaking rule is RC has been analyzed in detail by Desmedt and Elkind [6], albeit
for a slightly different model; we complement their results by consideringRL and RV .
We start by extending a result of Desmedt and Elkind to all three tie-breaking rules
considered in this paper.
Proposition 1. For every R ∈ {RL, RC , RV } and every utility profile u, if a ballot
vector b is a PNE of (L, R,u) then for every voter i ∈ N either bi = ⊥ or bi ∈ W (b).
Further, if |W (b)| = 1, then there exists exactly one voter i ∈ N with bi 6= ⊥.
Proof. Suppose that bi 6∈ W (b) for some voter i ∈ N . Then if i changes her vote to⊥,
the set W (b) will not change, so i’s utility would improve by ε, a contradiction with
b being a PNE of (L, R,u). Similarly, suppose that |W (b)| = 1 and there are two
voters i, i′ ∈ N with bi 6= ⊥, bi′ 6= ⊥. It has to be the case that bi = bi′ = cj for some
cj ∈ C, since otherwise |W (b)| ≥ 1. But then if voter i changes her vote to ⊥, cj will
remain the election winner, so i’s utility would improve by ε, a contradiction.
Lexicographic Tie-breaking The scenario where voters are lazy and ties are broken
lexicographically turns out to be fairly easy to analyze.
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Theorem 1. For any utility profile u the game G = (L, RL,u) has the following
properties:
1. If b is a PNE of G then |W (b)| ∈ {1,m}. Moreover, |W (b)| = m if and only if
b is the trivial ballot and all voters rank c1 first.
2. If b is a PNE of G then there exists at most one voter i with bi 6= ⊥.
3. G admits a PNE if and only if all voters rank c1 first (in which case c1 is the
unique PNE winner) or there exists a candidate cj with j > 1 such that (i)
sc(cj , a) > 0 and (ii) for every k < j it holds that all voters prefer cj to ck. If
such a candidate exists, he is unique, and wins in all PNE of G.
The following corollary is directly implied by Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. (L, RL)-EXISTNE, (L, RL)-SINGLENE and (L, RL)-TIENE are in P.
Remark 1. The reader may observe that, counterintuitively, while the lexicographic
tie-breaking rule appears to favor c1, it is impossible for c1 to win the election unless
he is ranked first by all voters. In contrast, c2 wins the election as long as he is ranked
first by at least one voter and no voter prefers c1 to c2. In general, the lexicographic tie-
breaking rule favors lower-numbered candidates with the exception of c1. As for c1, his
presence mostly has a destabilizing effect: if some, but not all voters rank c1 first, no
PNE exists. This phenomenon is an artifact of our treatment of the trivial ballot vector:
it disappears if we assume (as Desmedt and Elkind do) that when b = (⊥, . . . ,⊥) the
election is declared invalid and the utility of each voter is −∞: under this assumption
c1 is the unique possible equilibrium winner whenever he is ranked first by at least one
voter.
Randomized Tie-breaking We will now consider RC and RV . [6] characterize
utility profiles that admit a PNE for lazy voters and RC . However, there is a small dif-
ference between our model and that of Desmedt and Elkind: while we assume that the
trivial ballot vector results in a tie among all candidates, Desmedt and Elkind assume
that in this case the election is canceled and each voter’s utility is −∞. Further, the
results of Desmedt and Elkind implicitly assume that the number of voters n exceeds
the number of candidatesm; if this is not the case, Theorem 2 in their paper is incorrect
(see Remark 2).
Thus, we will now provide a full characterization of utility profiles u such that
(L, RC ,u) admits a PNE, and describe the corresponding equilibrium ballot profiles.
Our characterization result remains essentially unchanged if we replace RC with RV :
for almost all utility profilesu and ballot vectorsb it holds that b is a PNE of (L, RC ,u)
if and only if it is a PNE of (L, RV ,u); the only exception is the case of full consensus
(all voters rank the same candidate first).
Theorem 2. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, |C| = m, and let
R ∈ {RC , RV }. The game G = (L, R,u) admits a PNE if and only if one of the
following conditions holds:
(1) all voters rank some candidate cj first;
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(2) each candidate is ranked first by at most one voter, and, moreover, 1
n
∑
i∈N uℓ(ai) ≥
maxi∈N\{ℓ} uℓ(ai) for each ℓ ∈ N .
(3) there exists a set of candidates X = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓk} with 2 ≤ k ≤ min(n/2,m)
and a partition of the voters into k groupsN1, . . . , Nk of size n/k each such that
for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj we have cℓj ≻i c for all c ∈ X \ {cℓj}, and,
moreover, 1
k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥ maxc∈X\{cℓj} ui(c).
Further, if condition (1) holds for some cj ∈ C, then if R = RC then for each i ∈ N
the game G has a PNE where i votes for cj and all other voters abstain, whereas if
R = RV the game G has a PNE where all voters abstain; if condition (2) holds, then
G has a PNE where each voter votes for her top candidate; and if condition (3) holds
for some set X , then G has a PNE where each voter votes for her favorite candidate in
X . The game G has no other PNE.
Remark 2. Desmedt and Elkind claim (Theorems 1 and 2) that for RC and lazy voters
a PNE exists if and only if the utility profile satisfies either condition (1) or condition
(3) with constraint k ≤ n/2 removed. To see why this is incorrect, consider a 2-
voter election over the candidate set C = {x, y, z}, where voters’ utility functions are
consistent with preference orders x ≻ y ≻ z and x ≻ z ≻ y, respectively. According
to Desmedt and Elkind, the ballot vector (y, z) is a PNE of the corresponding game.
This is obviously not true: each of the voters would prefer to change her vote to x.
Note, however, that the two characterizations differ only when m ≥ n, and in practice
the number of voters usually exceeds the number of candidates.
Desmedt and Elkind show that checking condition (3) of Theorem 2 is NP-hard; in
their proof n > m, and the proof does not depend on how the trivial ballot is handled.
Further, their proof shows that checking whether a given candidate belongs to some
such set X is also NP-hard. On the other hand, Theorem 2 shows that PNE with
singleton winning sets only arise if some candidate is unanimously ranked first, and
this condition is easy to check. We summarize these observations as follows.
Corollary 2. For R ∈ {RC , RV }, the problems (L, R)-EXISTNE and (L, R)-TIENE
are NP-complete, whereas (L, R)-SINGLENE is in P.
4 Truth-biased Voters
For truth-biased voters, our exposition follows the same pattern as for lazy voters: we
present some general observations, followed by a quick summary of the results for
lexicographic tie-breaking, and conclude by analyzing randomized tie-breaking. The
following result is similar in spirit to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For every R ∈ {RL, RC , RV } and every utility profile u, if a ballot
vectorb is a PNE of (T , R,u) then for every voter i ∈ N either bi = ai, or bi ∈ W (b).
Proof. Consider a voter i ∈ N such that ai 6= bi and bi 6∈W (b). Suppose ai 6∈ W (b).
Then, if i changes her vote to ai, the new winning set is either W (b) or W (b) ∪ {ai}.
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In either case, i’s utility increases at least by ε, a contradiction. Suppose now that
ai ∈ W (b). This means that either W (b) = {ai} or ai is in a tie with other candidates
under b. Then, if i votes for ai, the new winning set is just {ai}, so i’s utility increases
by at least ε, a contradiction again.
Lexicographic Tie-breaking Obraztsova et al. [17] characterize the PNE of the
game (T , RL,u). As their characterization is quite complex, we will not reproduce it
here. However, for the purposes of comparison with the lazy voters model, we will use
the following description of truthful equilibria given by Obraztsova et al.
Proposition 3 (Obraztsova et al., Theorem 1). Consider a utility profile u, let a be the
respective truthful ballot vector, and let j = min{r | cr ∈W (a)}. Then a is a PNE of
(T , RL,u) if and only if neither of the following conditions holds:
(1) |W (a)| > 1, and there exists a candidate ck ∈ W (a) and a voter i such that
ai 6= ck and ck ≻i cj .
(2) H(a) 6= ∅, and there exists a candidate ck ∈ H(a) and a voter i such that
ai 6= ck, ck ≻i cj , and k < j.
We will also state a crucial property of non-truthful PNE, identified by Obraztsova
et al. For this, we first need the following definition.
Definition 1. Consider a ballot vector b, where candidate cj is the winner under RL.
A candidate ck 6= cj is called a threshold candidate with respect to b if either (1) k < j
and sc(ck,b) = sc(cj ,b) − 1 or (2) k > j and sc(ck,b) = sc(cj ,b). We denote the
set of threshold candidates with respect to b by T (b).
That is, a threshold candidate is someone who could win the election if he had one
additional vote. A feature of all non-truthful PNE is that there must exist at least one
threshold candidate. The intuition for this is that, since voters who are not pivotal prefer
to vote truthfully, in any PNE that arises under strategic voting, the winner receives just
enough votes so as to beat the required threshold (as set by the threshold candidate) and
not any more.
Lemma 1 (Obraztsova et al., Lemma 2). Consider a utility profile u, let a be the
respective truthful ballot vector, and let b 6= a be a non-truthful PNE of (T , RL,u).
Then T (b) 6= ∅. Further, sc(ck,b) = sc(ck, a) for every ck ∈ T (b), i.e., all voters
whose top choice is ck vote for ck.
The existence of a threshold candidate is an important observation about the struc-
ture of non-truthful PNE, and we will use it repeatedly in the sequel. We note that the
winner in a need not necessarily be a threshold candidate in a non-truthful PNE b.
Obraztsova et al. show that, given a candidate cp ∈ C and a score s, it is computa-
tionally hard to decide whether the game (T , RL,u) has a PNE b where cp wins with a
score of s. This problem may appear to be “harder” than (T , RL)-TIENE or (T , RL)-
SINGLENE, as one needs to ensure that cp obtains a specific score; on the other hand,
it does not distinguish between cp being the unique top-scorer or being tied with other
candidates and winning due to tie-breaking. We now complement this hardness result
by showing that all three problems we consider are NP-hard for T and RL.
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Theorem 3. (T , RL)-SINGLENE, (T , RL)-EXISTNE, and (T , RL)-TIENE are NP-
complete.
The proof is by a reduction from MAXIMUM k-SUBSET INTERSECTION (MSI)
(see the supplementary material). Surprisingly, the complexity of MSI was very re-
cently posed as an open problem by Clifford and Popa [5]; subsequently, MSI was
shown to be hard under Cook reductions by Xavier [21]. Here we first establish NP-
hardness of MSI under Karp reductions, which may be of independent interest, and
then show NP-hardness of our problems by constructing reductions from MSI.
Randomized Tie-breaking It turns out that for truth-biased voters the tie-breaking
rules RC and RV induce identical behavior by the voters; unlike for lazy voters, this
holds even if all voters rank the same candidate first.
For clarity, we present our characterization result for randomized tie-breaking in
three parts. We start by considering PNE with winning sets of size at least 2; the
analysis for this case turns out to be very similar to that for lazy voters.
Theorem 4. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, |C| = m, and let
R ∈ {RC , RV }. The game G = (T , R,u) admits a PNE with a winning set of size at
least 2 if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(1) each candidate is ranked first by at most one voter, and, moreover, 1
n
∑
i∈N uℓ(ai) ≥
maxi∈N\{ℓ} uℓ(ai) for each ℓ ∈ N .
(2) there exists a set of candidates X = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓk} with 2 ≤ k ≤ min(n/2,m)
and a partitioning of the voters into k groupsN1, . . . , Nk, of size n/k each, such
that for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj , we have cℓj ≻i c for all c ∈ X \ {cℓj},
and, moreover, 1
k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥ maxc∈X\{cℓj} ui(c).
Further, if condition (1) holds, then G has a PNE where each voter votes for her top
candidate, and if condition (2) holds for some X , then G has a PNE where each voter
votes for her favorite candidate in X . The game G has no other PNE.
The case where the winning set is a singleton is surprisingly complicated. We will
first characterize utility profiles that admit a truthful PNE with this property.
Theorem 5. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, let R ∈ {RC , RV },
and suppose that W (a) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C. Then a is a PNE of the game
G = (T , R,u) if and only if for every i ∈ N and every ck ∈ H(a) \ {ai}, it holds that
cj ≻i ck.
Finally, we consider elections that have non-truthful equilibria with singleton win-
ning sets.
Theorem 6. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, let R ∈ {RC , RV }, and
consider a ballot vector b with W (b) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C and br 6= ar for some
r ∈ N . Then b is a PNE of the game G = (T , R,u) if and only if all of the following
conditions hold:
(1) bi ∈ {ai, cj} for all i ∈ N ;
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(2) H(b) 6= ∅;
(3) cj ≻i ck for all i ∈ N and all ck ∈ H(b) \ {bi};
(4) for every candidate cℓ ∈ H ′(b) and each voter i ∈ N with bi = cj , i prefers cj
to the lottery where a candidate is chosen from H(b) ∪ {cj, cℓ} according to R.
We now consider the complexity of EXISTNE, TIENE, and SINGLENE for truth-
biased voters and randomized tie-breaking. The reader may observe that the character-
ization of PNE with ties in Theorem 6 is essentially identical to the one in Theorem 2.
As a consequence, we immediately obtain that (T , RC)-TIENE and (T , RV )-TIENE
are NP-hard. For EXISTNE and SINGLENE, a simple modification of the proof of The-
orem 3 shows that these problems remain hard under randomized tie-breaking. These
observations are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For R ∈ {RC , RV }, (T , R)-SINGLENE, (T , R)-TIENE, and (T , R)-
EXISTNE are NP-complete.
5 Comparison
We are finally in a position to compare the different models considered in this paper.
Tie-breaking rules We have demonstrated that in equilibrium the two randomized tie-
breaking rules (RC and RV ) induce very similar voter behavior, and identical election
outcomes, both for lazy and for truth-biased voters. This is quite remarkable, since
under truthful voting these tie-breaking rules can result in very different lotteries. In
contrast, there is a substantial difference between the randomized rules and the lexico-
graphic rule. For instance, when voters are lazy, EXISTNE is NP-hard for RC and RV ,
but polynomial-time solvable for RL. Further, the lexicographic rule is, by definition,
not anonymous, and Theorem 1 demonstrates that candidates with smaller indices have
a substantial advantage. For truth-biased voters the impact of tie-breaking rules is less
clear: while we have obtained NP-hardness results for all three rules, it appears that,
in contrast with lazy voters, for truth-biased voters randomized tie-breaking induces
“simpler” PNE than lexicographic tie-breaking.
Lazy vs. truth-biased voters Under lexicographic tie-breaking, the sets of equilibria
induced by the two types of secondary preferences are incomparable: there exists a
utility profile u such that the sets of candidates who can win in PNE of (L, RL,u) and
(T , RL,u) are disjoint.
Example 1. Let C = {c1, c2, c3}, and consider a 4-voter election with one vote of
the form c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1, and three votes of the form c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1. The only PNE
of (L, RL,u) is (c2,⊥,⊥,⊥), where c2 wins, whereas the only PNE of (T , RL,u) is
(c2, c3, c3, c3), where c3 wins.
For randomized tie-breaking, the situation is more interesting. For concreteness,
let us focus on RC . Note first that the utility profiles for which there exist PNE with
winning sets of size 2 or more are the same for both voter types. Further, if (L, RC ,u)
has a PNE b with |W (b)| = 1 (which happens only if there is a unanimous winner),
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then b is also a PNE of (T , RC ,u). However, (T , RC ,u) may have additional PNE,
including some non-truthful ones. In particular, for truth-biased voters, the presence of
a strong candidate is sufficient for stability: Proposition 3 implies that if there exists
a c ∈ C such that sc(c, a) ≥ sc(c′, a) + 2 for all c′ ∈ C \ {c}, then for any R ∈
{RL, RC , RV } the ballot vector a is a PNE of (T , R,u) with W (a) = {c}.
Existence of PNE One can argue that, when the number of voters is large relative to
the number of candidates, under reasonable probabilistic models of elections, the exis-
tence of a strong candidate (as defined in the previous paragraph) is exceedingly likely
(we omit the formal statement of this result and its proof due to space constraints), so
elections with truth-biased voters typically admit stable outcomes; this is corroborated
by the experimental results of [20]. In contrast, for lazy voters stability is more difficult
to achieve, unless there is a candidate that is unanimously ranked first: under random-
ized tie-breaking rules, there needs to be a very precise balance among the candidates
that end up being in W (b), and under RL the eventual winner has to Pareto-dominate
all candidates that lexicographically precede him. Either of these conditions appears to
be quite difficult to satisfy in a large election.
Quality of PNE In all of our models, a candidate ranked last by all voters cannot be
elected, in contrast to the basic game-theoretic model for Plurality voting. However,
not all non-desirable outcomes are eliminated: under RV and RC both lazy voters and
truth-biased voters can still elect a Pareto-dominated candidate with non-zero proba-
bility in PNE. This has been shown for lazy voters and RC by [6] (Example 1), and the
same example works for truth-biased voters and for RV . A similar construction shows
that a Pareto-dominated candidate may win under RL when voters are truth-biased. In
contrast, lazy voters cannot elect a Pareto-dominated candidate under RL: Theorem 1
shows that the winner has to be ranked first by some voter.
We can also measure the quality of PNE by analyzing the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
in both models. The study of PoA in the context of voting has been recently initiated by
Branzei et al. [4]. The additive version of PoA, which was considered by Branzei et al.,
is defined as the worst-case difference between the score of the winner under truthful
voting and the truthful score of a PNE winner. It turns out that PoA can be quite high,
both for lazy and truth-biased voters. To illustrate this, we provide in the supplementary
material two examples showing that under lexicographic tie-breaking PoA = Ω(n) in
both models. Similar results can be established for randomized tie-breaking as well.
Even though the PoA results are not encouraging, this is only a worst-case analysis
and we expect PNE to have a better performance on average. For the truth-biased
model, this is also supported by the experimental evaluation of Thompson et al. [20],
who showed that in the truth-biased model most PNE identified in their simulations had
good social welfare properties. Formalizing this observation, i.e., providing average-
case analysis of the quality of PNE in voting games, is a promising topic for future
work.
6 Extension: Principled Voters
The results of this paper can be extended to the setting where some of the voters are
principled, i.e., always vote truthfully (and never abstain). Due to space constraints,
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we relegate the formal statements of our results for this extended model to the supple-
mentary material. Briefly, the presence of principled voters has the strongest effect on
lazy voters and lexicographic tie-breaking, whereas for other settings the effect is less
pronounced. All computational problems that were easy in the standard model remain
easy in the extended model (and, obviously, all hard problems remain hard). Finally,
in the presence of principled voters the random candidate tie-breaking rule is no longer
equivalent to the random voter tie-breaking rule.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have characterized PNE of Plurality voting for several combinations of secondary
preferences and tie-breaking rules. Our complexity results are summarized in Table 1.
A promising direction for future work is to investigate more general classes of tie-
breaking rules. It is also interesting to consider the complexity of various refinements
of Nash equilibria for our models, such as strong Nash equilibria (for which an analysis
for T and RL can be found in the work of Obraztsova et al. [17]), or subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria for settings where voters submit their ballots one by one; see [6] and
[22] for some results about such equilibria.
SINGLENE TIENE EXISTNE
(L, RL) P (Cor. 1) P (Cor. 1) P (Cor. 1)
(L, RC) P (Cor. 2) NPc (Cor. 2) NPc (Cor. 2)
(L, RV ) P (Cor. 2) NPc (Cor. 2) NPc (Cor. 2)
(T , RL) NPc (Thm. 3) NPc (Thm. 3) NPc (Thm. 3)
(T , RC) NPc (Cor. 3) NPc (Cor. 3) NPc (Cor. 3)
(T , RV ) NPc (Cor. 3) NPc (Cor. 3) NPc (Cor. 3)
Table 1: Complexity results: P stands for “polynomial-time solvable”, NPc stands for
“NP-complete”.
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A Proofs Omitted from Section 3
Theorem 1. For any utility profile u the game G = (L, RL,u) has the following
properties:
1. If b is a PNE of G then |W (b)| ∈ {1,m}. Moreover, |W (b)| = m if and only if
b is the trivial ballot and all voters rank c1 first.
2. If b is a PNE of G then there exists at most one voter i with bi 6= ⊥.
3. G admits a PNE if and only if all voters rank c1 first (in which case c1 is the
unique PNE winner) or there exists a candidate cj with j > 1 such that (i)
sc(cj , a) > 0 and (ii) for every k < j it holds that all voters prefer cj to ck. If
such a candidate exists, he is unique, and wins in all PNE of G.
Proof. Fix a utility profile u and a ballot b such that b is a PNE of G = (L, RL,u).
To prove the first claim, suppose first that 1 < |W (b)| and b is not trivial. Then
there are two candidates cj , ck ∈W (b), j < k, such that sc(cj ,b) > 0 and sc(ck,b) >
0. Hence, there exists at least one voter who votes for ck. However, the election
outcome will not change if this voter abstains, a contradiction with b being a PNE of
G. Now, suppose that b is trivial. In this case W (b) = C and c1 wins. If any voter
prefers some other candidate c to c1, she can improve her utility by voting for c, as this
will change the election outcome to c. On the other hand, if all voters rank c1 first, the
trivial ballot is clearly a PNE.
The second claim follows from our first claim and Proposition 1.
To prove the third claim, suppose that there exists a candidate cj , j > 1, satisfying
conditions (i) and (ii). Consider a ballot vector b where bi = cj for some voter i with
ai = cj (the existence of such voter is guaranteed by condition (i)) and bi′ = ⊥ for all
i′ ∈ N \ {i}. Voter i cannot benefit from voting for another candidate or abstaining,
as this will change the election outcome to one she likes less than the current outcome.
Any other voter can only change the election outcome if she votes for a candidate ck
with k < j. But then condition (ii) implies that no voter wants the election outcome to
change in this way. Conversely, suppose that b is a PNE. We have argued that either b
is trivial or bi = cj for some i ∈ N and some cj ∈ C and bi′ = ⊥ for all i′ ∈ N \ {i}.
In the latter case, if cj 6= ai, voter i can improve her utility by voting for ai. Moreover,
if j = 1, voter i can improve her utility by abstaining, as c1 would remain the election
winner in this case. Finally, if there exists a candidate ck with k < j such that some
voter i′ prefers ck to cj , then i′ can change the election outcome to ck by voting for ck.
It remains to show that conditions (i) and (ii) can be satisfied by at most one can-
didate. To see this, note that if both cj and ck satisfy condition (i) and j < k, then ck
violates condition (ii), as the voter who ranks cj first clearly prefers cj to ck.
Theorem 2. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, |C| = m, and let
R ∈ {RC , RV }. The game G = (L, R,u) admits a PNE if and only if one of the
following conditions holds:
(1) all voters rank some candidate cj first;
15
(2) each candidate is ranked first by at most one voter, and, moreover, 1
n
∑
i∈N uℓ(ai) ≥
maxi∈N\{ℓ} uℓ(ai) for each ℓ ∈ N .
(3) there exists a set of candidates X = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓk} with 2 ≤ k ≤ min(n/2,m)
and a partition of the voters into k groupsN1, . . . , Nk of size n/k each such that
for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj we have cℓj ≻i c for all c ∈ X \ {cℓj}, and,
moreover, 1
k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥ maxc∈X\{cℓj} ui(c).
Further, if condition (1) holds for some cj ∈ C, then if R = RC then for each i ∈ N
the game G has a PNE where i votes for cj and all other voters abstain, whereas if
R = RV the game G has a PNE where all voters abstain; if condition (2) holds, then
G has a PNE where each voter votes for her top candidate; and if condition (3) holds
for some set X , then G has a PNE where each voter votes for her favorite candidate in
X . The game G has no other PNE.
Proof. It is easy to see that any of the conditions (1)–(3) is sufficient for the existence
of PNE, with ballot vectors described in the statement of the theorem witnessing this.
We will now show that satisfying at least one of these conditions is necessary for the
existence of a PNE, and that no other ballot vector is a PNE. Fix a tie-breaking rule
R ∈ {RC , RV }, a utility profile u, and suppose that a ballot vector b is a PNE of
(L, R,u). We will argue that u satisfies one of the conditions (1)–(3).
Suppose first that W (b) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C. By Proposition 1 there exists a
voter i ∈ N with bi = cj , and bi′ = ⊥ for all i′ ∈ N \ {i}. It has to be the case that
ai = cj : otherwise voter i can make ai the unique winner by changing her vote to ai,
thus increasing her utility. Now, suppose that ai′ 6= cj for some i′ ∈ N \ {i}. If voter
i′ changes her ballot to cℓ = ai′ , the new winning set is {cj, cℓ}. Now, if R = RC ,
the overall utility of i′ is given by 12 (ui′(cℓ) + ui′(cj)), and if R = R
V
, the overall
utility of i′ is given by λui′(cℓ) + (1 − λ)ui′(cj), where λ ≥ 1n (this is because voter
i′ herself ranks cℓ above cj). In both cases, i′ can increase her utility by voting cℓ, a
contradiction. Hence, it has to be the case that all voters rank cj first, i.e., condition (1)
is satisfied.
Now, suppose that |W (b)| > 1. We will argue that in this case either all voters
abstain or no voter abstains. Indeed, suppose that bi = ⊥, bℓ 6= ⊥ for some i, ℓ ∈ N ,
i.e., each candidate in W (b) receives at least one vote. If, instead of abstaining, i votes
for her most preferred candidate in W (b), this candidate becomes the unique election
winner. In contrast, under b i’s least preferred candidate in W (b) wins with positive
probability: this is immediate for R = RC , and for R = RV this holds because for
every cj ∈ W (b) there exists a voter i′ with bi′ = cj , and cj wins whenever ties are
broken according to the preferences of voter i′. Thus, i can improve her utility by
changing her vote, a contradiction. Hence, if |W (b)| = k and b is not trivial, each
candidate in W (b) receives exactly n/k votes.
In particular, if |W (b)| = n and b is not trivial, each candidate in W (b) receives
exactly one vote. We will argue that in this case condition (2) is satisfied. We will first
prove that bi = ai for all i ∈ N . Indeed, suppose that bi 6= ai for some i ∈ N , and
consider the ballot vector b′ = (b−i, ai). If ai ∈W (b), then W (b′) = {ai}, whereas
under b voter i’s least preferred candidate in W (b) wins with positive probability. If
ai 6∈ W (b), we haveW (b′) = (W (b)\{bi})∪{ai}, so Ui(b′) = Ui(b)+ 1n (ui(ai)−
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ui(bi)) > Ui(b). In both cases i can increase her overall utility by voting for ai, a
contradiction. Hence, we have W (b) = {ai | i ∈ N}. Thus, under both RC and RV
the outcome of this election is a lottery that assigns equal probability to all candidates
in W (b). Now, if any voter prefers her second most preferred candidate in W (b) to
this lottery, she can vote for that candidate, making him the unique election winner, a
contradiction with b being a PNE. Thus, in this case condition (2) is satisfied.
Now, suppose that b is not trivial and |W (b)| = k < n. We have argued that
each candidate in W (b) receives exactly n/k votes. This means that k divides n, so in
particular k ≤ n/2 and each candidate in W (b) receives at least two votes. Under both
of our tie-breaking rules, each candidate in W (b) wins with probability 1/k. Consider
a voter i. She can make any candidate in W (b) \ {bi} the unique election winner by
voting for him. Since b is a PNE, no voter wants to change the election outcome in
this way; this implies, in particular, that each voter votes for her favorite candidate in
W (b). Thus, in this case condition (3) is satisfied with X = W (b); the voters are
partitioned into groups according to their votes in b.
It remains to consider the case where b is the trivial ballot vector. When R = RC ,
b cannot be a PNE: under b the outcome is a uniform lottery over C, and every voter
would rather vote for her favorite candidate in order to make him the unique winner.
When R = RV , the outcome is a lottery that assigns a positive probability to each
candidate in A = {ai | i ∈ N}. If |A| > 1, b is not a PNE: each voter would prefer
to vote for her favorite candidate in order to make him the unique winner. However, if
A is a singleton, i.e., all voters rank some candidate cj first, the trivial ballot vector is
a PNE: after all voters abstain, RV picks a random voter, and this voter selects cj .
B Proofs Omitted from Section 4
The following problem is very useful in our constructions.
Definition 2. An instance of MAXIMUM k-SUBSET INTERSECTION (MSI) is a tuple
(E , A1, . . . , Am, k, q), where E = {e1, . . . , en} is a finite set of elements, each Ai,
i ∈ [m], is a subset of E , and k, q are positive integers. It is a “yes”-instance if there
exist sets Ai1 , . . . , Aik such that | ∩j∈[k] Aij | ≥ q, and a “no”-instance otherwise.
Despite the relevance of MSI to various optimization scenarios, see e.g. [21], it
was only recently shown that this problem is hard under a Cook reduction. We provide
below a Karp reduction, establishing NP-completeness of MSI.
Theorem 7. MSI is NP-complete.
Proof. Trivially MSI is in NP. For hardness, we provide a reduction from the BAL-
ANCED COMPLETE BIPARTITE SUBGRAPH problem. An instance of this problem
consists of a bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E), and an integer k. It is a ”yes”-instance
if there exist sets S1 ⊆ V1, S2 ⊆ V2, with |S1| = |S2| = k, such that the subgraph
induced by S1 and S2 is a complete bipartite subgraph. This problem is known to be
NP-complete, see [10].
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Consider an instance I of this problem, given by G and some integer k. We con-
struct an instance I ′ of MSI as follows: we let E = V1. We also let the elements of
V2 correspond to sets. In particular, for every j ∈ V2, we have a corresponding set
Aj ⊆ E , such that Aj = {i ∈ V1 : (i, j) ∈ E}. We set the parameter k in MSI to
be the same as the integer k from I . We also set q = k. We now claim that I is a
”yes”-instance of BALANCED COMPLETE BIPARTITE SUBGRAPH if and only if I ′ is
a ”yes”-instance of MSI.
To see this, suppose there exist S1 ⊆ V1, S2 ⊆ V2, such that we have a complete
bipartite subgraph induced by S1 and S2. Then take the k sets corresponding to S2.
Clearly every element from S1 belongs to all these sets, hence the intersection of these
sets is at least k. For the reverse direction, suppose there exists a collection of k sets
in I ′ whose intersection is at least k. Then take as S2 the k vertices that correspond to
these sets. Let also S1 be any k-element subset of the intersection. Then obviously, the
bipartite graph induced by S1 and S2 is complete.
We can now prove Theorem 3, utilizing the hardness of MSI.
Theorem 3. (T , RL)-SINGLENE, (T , RL)-EXISTNE, and (T , RL)-TIENE are NP-
complete.
Proof. We will first establish the NP-completeness of (T , RL)-SINGLENE, and then
show how to modify the proof for the other two problems. It is trivial to show that
(T , RL)-SINGLENE is in NP, so we focus on showing that it is NP-hard.
We provide a reduction from MSI. Consider an instance I of the MSI problem.
We can assume that for every e ∈ E there exists an index i, such that e /∈ Ai and
m > n+ k + q (if this is not the case we can add several additional empty sets).
We now construct an instance of our problem. We have n + 3 candidates, namely,
C = E ∪ {w1, w2, w3}, with ties broken according to e1 > . . . en > w3 > w1 >
w2. We set w2 to be the target winning candidate, i.e., cp := w2. Finally, we set
δ = 16(n+m) . We will now describe the voters’ preferences and their utility functions
(while the utility functions play no role in this proof, we will use the same construction
in the NP-hardness proof for randomized tie-breaking, see Corollary 3, where they do
matter). The voters in our instance are split into five blocks as follows.
• Block 1: For every i ∈ [m] we construct a voter vi who ranks the candidates as
w3 ≻ E \Ai ≻ w2 ≻ Ai ≻ w1. We let ui denote the utility function of vi, which
we construct as follows. We set ui(w3) = 1, ui(w2) = 12 , ui(w1) =
1
4 . Further,
vi assigns utility of 1 − jδ to her j-th most preferred candidate in E \ Ai. Note
that |E \ Ai| < n, so these numbers are strictly between 1 and 1/2 and they are
consistent with the ranking of voter vi. Finally, vi assigns utility of 1/2− jδ to
her j-th most preferred candidate in Ai; these numbers are strictly between 1/2
and 1/4.
• Block 2: We set s = m− k+ 3, and we add s− 1 voters whose preferences are
of the form w1 ≻ w2 ≻ w3 ≻ E .
• Block 3: We add s − k − (n − q) − 1 voters with preferences of the form
w2 ≻ w1 ≻ w3 ≻ E .
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• Block 4: For every ej ∈ E , we add s − 2 voters with preferences of the form
ej ≻ w3 ≻ w2 ≻ w1 ≻ E \ {ej}.
• Block 5: A voter with preferences of the form w3 ≻ w2 ≻ E ≻ w1.
Each of the voters in blocks 2–5 assigns utility of 1− δ(j − 1) to the j-th candidate in
her ranking.
Let I ′ be the constructed instance. We want to establish that I is a “yes”-instance of
the MSI problem if and only if I ′ is a “yes”-instance of (T , RL)-SINGLENE. Suppose
first that I ′ is a “yes”-instance of our problem. Then there exists a PNE b with W (b) =
{w2}. We will first establish some properties of b.
Let a denote the truthful ballot for I ′. We have sc(w1, a) = s − 1, sc(w2, a) =
s− k− (n− q)− 1, sc(w3, a) = m+ 1 = s+ k− 2, and sc(ej , a) = s− 2 for every
ej ∈ E . It follows that w2 is not among the winners in a.
We will now argue that in the PNE b, T (b) = {w1}. We know by Lemma 1 that
T (b) 6= ∅. Since w2 is the winner at b, w2 6∈ T (b). Also, it is easy to see that
w3 /∈ T (b). Indeed, suppose the contrary. All voters in Block 4 prefer w3 to w2. By
Proposition 2, in b these voters vote either for their top choice or for W (b) = {w2},
hence not for w3. But if w3 ∈ T (b), each of these voters would prefer to switch
to voting w3, a contradiction with b being a PNE. A similar argument shows that
E ∩ T (b) = ∅. Indeed, we assumed that for every eℓ ∈ E there exists i such that
eℓ /∈ A
i
. Then voter vi from Block 1 prefers eℓ to w2, and eℓ is not her top choice.
By Proposition 2, in b voter vi votes for her top choice or for w2, but if eℓ ∈ T (b),
she would prefer to change her vote to eℓ, a contradiction with b being a PNE. As
we have ruled out all candidates except for w1, it follows that T (b) = {w1}, and
hence, by Lemma 1, sc(w1,b) = s− 1. Then, by the tie-breaking rule, it must be that
sc(w2,b) = s. Thus, in b candidate w2 receives exactly k + n − q + 1 non-truthful
votes, in addition to the votes of his own supporters. We also know that the voters from
Block 3 keep voting forw2 in b, and, by Lemma 1, the voters from Block 2 keep voting
for w1 in b. Hence w2 receives the extra k+n− q+1 votes in b from Blocks 1, 4 and
5.
We claim that sc(w3,b) ≤ s − 3. Indeed, we have sc(c′,b) ≤ s − 2 for all
c′ ∈ E ∪ {w3} since T (b) = {w1}. Further, if sc(w3,b) = s− 2, then b would not be
a PNE, as some voters from Blocks 1, 4, and 5 vote for w2, but all of them preferw3 to
w2. Thus, since the only supporters of w3 are in Block 1 and Block 5, in total, we must
have at least k + 1 voters from Blocks 1 and 5 who vote for w2 in b. This means that
there are at least k voters from Block 1, who have deviated to w2. Now, we pick all sets
Aij for all j ∈ [k] such that vij votes for w2 in b. We will argue that | ∩j∈[k] Aij | ≥ q.
To see this, let E ′ = {e ∈ E | sc(e,b) = s − 2}. Note that in b there are at most
n − q voters in Block 4 who vote for w2. Hence, we have |E ′| ≥ q. To complete the
proof, we only need to argue that for each e ∈ E ′ we have e ∈ Aij for all j ∈ [k].
Indeed, fix some e ∈ E ′ and some j ∈ [k]. By our choice of Aij , the corresponding
voter vij has voted for w2 in b. Suppose that vij prefers e to w2. If she changes her
vote to e, then e becomes the new winner, due to tie-breaking, a contradiction with b
being a PNE. Thus, it has to be the case that vij prefers w2 to e, which means that
e ∈ Aij , as we wanted to prove. Hence, a “yes”-instance for (T , RL)-SINGLENE,
corresponds to a ”yes”-instance of MSI.
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For the converse direction, suppose that for the instance I , there is a collection of
sets Ai1 , . . . , Aik with | ∩j∈[k] Aij | ≥ q. Let E ′ = ∩j∈[k]Aij . We identify below a set
of voters, N ′, from the instance I ′, which allows us to construct an equilibrium profile.
We include in N ′ the set {vij | j ∈ [k]}. We also add to N ′ the voter from Block 5.
Furthermore, for each e 6∈ E ′, we add to N ′ one voter from Block 4 who ranks e first.
Observe that at this point we have |N ′| ≤ k+(n−q)+1. If |N ′| < k+(n−q)+1, we
pick n−q+k+1−|N ′| additional voters from Block 4, corresponding to supporters of
elements e 6∈ E ′, and add them to N ′. Now, consider a ballot vector b where the voters
in N ′ vote in favor of w2, and everyone else votes truthfully. We have sc(w2,b) = s,
sc(w1,b) = s−1, sc(w3,b) = s−3, sc(e,b) ≤ s−3 for all e ∈ E\E ′, sc(e,b) = s−2
for all e ∈ E ′. Hence, w2 is the winner, and all non-truthful voters rank w2 abovew1 as
well as above all candidates in E ′ (who could possibly become winners if some voters
had an incentive to vote for them). Thus, b is a PNE.
Finally, we comment on the hardness of the problems (T , RL)-EXISTNE and
(T , RL)-TIENE. For (T , RL)-TIENE, we can make a small modification to the re-
duction above. Specifically, it suffices to switch the tie-breaking order between w1 and
w2, and also add one more voter to Block 2 in favor of w1. For (T , RL)-EXISTNE,
hardness is again based on a modification of the reduction above: we can add k − 1
additional copies of w3 into the profile and change s to m + 2. In this case it can be
shown that w1 is the only possible threshold candidate and hence only w2 can be a
winner in a PNE. We omit further details from this version.
Theorem 4. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, |C| = m, and let
R ∈ {RC , RV }. The game G = (T , R,u) admits a PNE with a winning set of size at
least 2 if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(1) each candidate is ranked first by at most one voter, and, moreover, 1
n
∑
i∈N uℓ(ai) ≥
maxi∈N\{ℓ} uℓ(ai) for each ℓ ∈ N .
(2) there exists a set of candidates X = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓk} with 2 ≤ k ≤ min(n/2,m)
and a partitioning of the voters into k groupsN1, . . . , Nk, of size n/k each, such
that for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj , we have cℓj ≻i c for all c ∈ X \ {cℓj},
and, moreover, 1
k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥ maxc∈X\{cℓj} ui(c).
Further, if condition (1) holds, then G has a PNE where each voter votes for her top
candidate, and if condition (2) holds for some X , then G has a PNE where each voter
votes for her favorite candidate in X . The game G has no other PNE.
Proof. It is clear that if one of the conditions (1)–(2) is satisfied then the game admits a
PNE of the form described in the statement of the theorem. For the converse direction,
fix a tie-breaking rule R ∈ {RC , RV } and a utility profile u, and suppose that a ballot
vector b is a PNE of (T , R,u) with |W (b)| ≥ 2. We will argue that u satisfies one of
the conditions (1)–(2).
If |W (b)| = n, each candidate in W (b) receives exactly one vote. As argued in
the proof of Theorem 2, this means that each voter votes for her favorite candidate,
and prefers the uniform lottery over A = {ai | i ∈ N} to her second most preferred
candidate in A being the unique winner, i.e., condition (1) holds.
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Now, suppose that |W (b)| < n. We claim that bi ∈ W (b) for all i ∈ N . Indeed,
suppose that bi 6∈ W (b) for some i ∈ N . Let cj be voter i’s most preferred candidate
in W (b). If i changes her vote to cj , cj becomes the unique winner, whereas when
she votes bi, the outcome is a lottery over W (b) where candidates other than cj have a
positive chance of winning. Thus, i can profitably deviate, a contradiction. Thus, there
exists a k ≥ 2 such that each candidate in W (b) receives n/k votes. An argument
similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that condition (2) must be satisfied.
Theorem 5. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, let R ∈ {RC , RV },
and suppose that W (a) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C. Then a is a PNE of the game
G = (T , R,u) if and only if for every i ∈ N and every ck ∈ H(a) \ {ai} it holds that
cj ≻i ck.
Proof. Consider the ballot vector a and a voter i ∈ N . Clearly, if ai = cj , voter
i cannot improve her utility by deviating. Otherwise, the only way i can change the
election outcome is by changing her vote to some ck ∈ H(a) \ {ai}, in which case
the outcome is a lottery over {cj, ck} where both of these candidates has a positive
chance of winning. The condition of the theorem says that no voter wants to change
the election outcome in this way.
Theorem 6. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be a utility profile over C, let R ∈ {RC , RV }, and
consider a ballot vector b with W (b) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C and br 6= ar for some
r ∈ N . Then b is a PNE of the game G = (T , R,u) if and only if all of the following
conditions hold:
(1) bi ∈ {ai, cj} for all i ∈ N ;
(2) H(b) 6= ∅;
(3) cj ≻i ck for all i ∈ N and all ck ∈ H(b) \ {bi};
(4) for every candidate cℓ ∈ H ′(b) and each voter i ∈ N with bi = cj , i prefers cj
to the lottery where a candidate is chosen from H(b) ∪ {cj, cℓ} according to R.
Proof. Suppose that a ballot profile b satisfies conditions (1)–(4) of the theorem, and
consider a voter i ∈ N . If bi = ai = cj , the current outcome is optimal for i. If
bi = ai 6= cj , the only way that voter i can change the election outcome is by voting
for a candidate ck ∈ H(b) \ {ai}, in which case the winner will be chosen from
{cj, ck} according to R. By condition (3), voter i does not benefit from this change.
By Proposition 2, the only remaining possibility is that bi = cj 6= ai. Then i can
change the election outcome by (a) voting for a candidate ck ∈ H(b); (b) voting for a
candidate cℓ ∈ H ′(b); or (c) voting for a candidate in C \ (H(b) ∪H ′(b) ∪ {cj}). In
case (a) ck becomes the unique winner, so by condition (3) this change is not profitable
to i. In case (b) the outcome is a tie among the candidates in H(b) ∪ {cj , cℓ}, so by
condition (4) voter i cannot profit from this change. Finally, in case (c) the outcome is
a tie among the candidates in H(b) ∪ {cj}, and by condition (3), i prefers the current
outcome to this one. Thus, a ballot vector satisfying conditions (1)–(4) is indeed a
PNE.
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Conversely, suppose that b is a PNE of (T , R,u) for some R ∈ {RC , RV } and
some utility profile u, where br 6= ar for some r ∈ N . It follows from Proposition 2
that b satisfies condition (1). If condition (2) is violated, voter r can increase her utility
by ε, by changing her vote to ar, as cj would remain the unique election winner in
this case. If condition (3) is violated for some i ∈ N and some ck ∈ H(b), voter i
can profitably deviate by changing her vote to ck; if bi = cj , ck would then become
the unique election winner, and if bi 6= cj , the outcome will be a tie between cj and
ck, so under R each of them will win with positive probability. Similarly, if condition
(4) is violated for some i ∈ N and some cℓ ∈ H ′(b), voter i can profitably deviate
by changing her vote to cℓ, so that the outcome becomes a tie among H(b) ∪ {cj, cℓ}.
This concludes the proof.
Corollary 3. For R ∈ {RC , RV }, (T , R)-SINGLENE, (T , R)-TIENE, and (T , R)-
EXISTNE are NP-complete.
Proof. Let R ∈ {RC , RV }. For (T , R)-TIENE, as mentioned above, our claim fol-
lows from Theorem 2 and its implications, as discussed in the section on lazy voters.
For (T , R)-SINGLENE with R ∈ {RC , RV }, we can use the same reduction from
MSI as in Theorem 3. The only change is the analysis in the last part of the proof
of Theorem 3, due to the different tie-breaking rule. In particular, suppose again that
a PNE b exists, where w2 is the winner. By the analysis of Theorem 3, the set of
candidates E ′ = {e ∈ E | sc(e,b) = s − 2} contains at least q elements. Consider a
candidate e ∈ E ′. Suppose that among the voters from Block 1 who deviated to w2,
there exists a voter vij who prefers e to w2. Her utility in b is 1/2. Suppose that she
deviates to e instead. In this case the score of w1, w2, and e becomes s− 1. Therefore,
the new winning set is {w1, w2, e}. Given that uij (w1) = 1/4 and uij (e) > 3/4, the
utility of voter vij becomes more than 1/2, contradicting the fact that b is a PNE. Thus,
for any voter vij in Block 1 who deviated to w2, and for any candidate e ∈ E ′ it holds
that vij prefers w2 to e, i.e., e ∈ Aij . Thus, e ∈ Aij for each j ∈ [k], where the sets
Ai1 , . . . , Aik are defined in the proof of Theorem 3. As this holds for every e ∈ E ′ and
|E ′| ≥ q, this means that we have a “yes”-instance of MSI. For the reverse direction,
the arguments are very similar to the reverse direction in the proof of Theorem 3.
Finally, regarding (T , RL)-EXISTNE, a simple modification in the reduction of
Theorem 3 can yield the desired result; we omit the details from this version.
C Price of Anarchy under Lexicographic Tie-breaking
We show that PoA = Ω(n) both for lazy and for truth-biased voters under lexico-
graphic tie-breaking. In particular, we first establish that PoA = n− 2 for lazy voters.
Then we show that PoA = 2n/3 in the truth-biased model. Similar results can be
proved for randomized tie-breaking, and we omit them from this version of the paper.
Proposition 4. For lexicographic tie-breaking and lazy voters, PoA = n− 2.
Proof. We prove first that PoA ≤ n−2. To see this, note that by Theorem 1, the winner
in any PNE must have a positive score in the truthful profile. Thus, in the worst-case
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scenario for the Price of Anarchy, the truthful winner of a has score n − 1, and there
is a PNE where the winner is the candidate supported by the remaining voter. Thus
PoA ≤ n− 2.
To show the lower bound it suffices to exhibit an example. This is done in Example
2 below.
Example 2. Consider the lazy voters model and the profile of Figure 1, with n voters
and n candidates. It does not matter how we fill in the missing rankings in the figure.
The truthful winner is c3 with a score of n − 1. However, consider the profile b =
(c2,⊥,⊥, . . . ,⊥). The winner in b is c2, and no voter can unilaterally change the
outcome in her favor. Indeed, if anyone votes for c1, then c1 is the new winner, but all
voters prefer c2 to c1. On the other hand, voting for any other candidate cannot change
the outcome due to tie-breaking. Since the score of c2 in a is 1, we have PoA ≥ n− 2.
1 2 3 . . . n
c2 c3 c3 . . . c3
.
.
. c2 c2 . . . c2
.
.
. c1 c1 . . . c1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
.
Figure 1: PoA example for lazy voters.
Proposition 5. For lexicographic tie-breaking and truth-biased voters, PoA = 2n/3.
This holds even for single-peaked or single-crossing preference profiles.
Proof. As in Proposition 4, we first prove the upper bound. Let ci be the winner in the
truthful profile with a score of s∗. Let b 6= a be a non-truthful PNE and let cj be the
winner in b. Clearly, we have PoA ≤ s∗, since in the worst case cj has no supporters
in a. Hence, it is enough to bound s∗.
By Lemma 1, we know that there exists at least one threshold candidate with respect
to b. We consider two cases:
Case 1: ci 6∈ T (b). Then there is some ck 6= ci such that ck ∈ T (b) Let s = sc(ck, a).
By Lemma 1 we know that ck receives s points in b as well. Hence cj has a score of at
most s+ 1 in b. By Proposition 2 this means that there are at most s+ 1 non-truthful
votes in b. Hence the score of ci in b has to be at least s∗ − (s + 1). Since ci is not a
winner in b, we have s∗ − (s+ 1) ≤ sc(ci,b) ≤ s+ 1, and hence s∗ ≤ 2s+ 2. Since
the total score of ci and ck in a does not exceed n, we have s + s∗ ≤ n. But then, if
s∗ > 2n/3, this would imply that s > n/3− 1, i.e., s ≥ n/3, and hence s+ s∗ > n, a
contradiction. Thus we have PoA ≤ s∗ ≤ 2n/3.
Case 2: ci ∈ T (b). In this case the Price of Anarchy is somewhat better. Let s =
sc(cj ,b). Candidate ci must have the same set of votes in b as in a by Lemma 1.
Hence we have s + s∗ ≤ n. But we must also have s∗ ≤ s, otherwise cj is not the
winner. But then if s∗ > n/2, we would also have s > n/2, a contradiction. Thus, in
this case we have PoA ≤ s∗ ≤ n/2.
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Hence in worst case, PoA ≤ 2n/3. Finally, to show that the worst case is attained,
we exhibit a construction in Example 3.
Example 3. In Figure 2, we show a preference profile for n voters, where n is divisible
by 3. Block 1 consists of n/3 voters, Block 2 consists of n/3 + 1 voters, and Block 3
has n/3−1 voters. In the figure, it does not matter how we fill in the missing rankings,
but note that we can fill them in a way that makes the preference profile single-peaked
or single-crossing.
Suppose the tie-breaking rule is c1 > c2 > c3. Under truthful voting, c3 is the
winner with a score of 2n/3. We claim now that the profile b, in which all voters of
Block 2 vote for c2 is a PNE. To see this, note that c2 is indeed the winner in b with
a score of n/3 + 1. Candidate c1 would only need one additional vote to become the
winner, but there is no incentive for any voter from Block 2 or 3 to vote for c1, since
all of them prefer c2 to c1. Also, no voter from Block 2 can change the outcome in
favor of c3 by a unilateral deviation, due to the tie-breaking rule. If a voter from Block
2 switches to her truthful vote, then the new winner is c1, since there is a tie with all
candidates. Hence b is a PNE, and the score of c2 in the truthful profile is 0. This
means that in this example we have PoA ≥ 2n/3.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
c1 c1 ... c1 c3 c3 ... c3 c3 c3 ... c3
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. ...
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.
.
.
arbitrary arbitrary arbitrary
.
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.
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.
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.
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.
.
.
. ...
.
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.
c2 c2 ... c2 c2 c2 ... c2 c2 c2 ... c2
c3 c3 ... c3 c1 c1 ... c1 c1 c1 ... c1
Figure 2: PoA example for truth-biased voters
D Principled Voters
We will now present our results for the setting with principled voters. We omit the
proofs of all results in this section, as they follow directly from the analysis presented
earlier in the paper.
In what follows, we consider elections with a set of strategic (i.e., lazy or truth-
biased) voters N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of principled voters P = {n+ 1, . . . , n+ s};
we assume that either all voters in N are lazy or all of them are truth-biased. We extend
our notation to such games as follows: given a setting S ∈ {L, T }, a tie-breaking rule
R ∈ {RL, RV , RC}, n strategic voters with utilities u = (u1, . . . , un), and s prin-
cipled voters, whose votes are given by the ballot vector aP = (an+1, . . . , an+s), we
denote the resulting game by (S, R,u, aP ). The principled voters are not considered to
be among the players; thus, the set of players in the modified game is still N . As before,
we use b to denote a ballot vector of the strategic voters; b+aP denotes a ballot vector
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that combines the votes of the strategic and principled voters. The computational prob-
lems EXISTNE, TIENE, and SINGLENE extend naturally to this setting; we denote
the respective variants of these problems by EXISTNEP , TIENEP , and SINGLENEP ,
respectively.
Principled + Lazy Voters, Lexicographic Tie-breaking
We have argued that in elections where all voters are lazy and the tie-breaking rule is
RL, there is at most one voter who does not abstain and all PNE have the same winner.
However, in the presence of principled voters, this is no longer true; indeed, there are
elections where every candidate can win in a PNE.
Example 4. Consider an election over a candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cm}, m > 1,
where there are two principled voters who both vote for cm, and two lazy voters who
both rank cm last. Then the ballot vector where both lazy voters abstain is a PNE (with
winner cm). Moreover, for every j ∈ [m− 1] the ballot vector where both lazy voters
vote for cj is a PNE as well (with winner cj).
Nevertheless, given an election with principled and lazy voters, we can characterize
the set of candidates who can win in a PNE of the respective game.
Proposition 6. Let u be the lazy voters’ utility profile over C and let aP be the princi-
pled voters’ ballot vector. Let j = min{k | ck ∈ W (aP )}, and let H+(aP ) = {ck ∈
H(aP ) | k < j}. Then the game G = (L, RL,u, aP ) has the following properties.
(1) If b is a PNE of G then there is at most one candidate c ∈ C such that bi = c
for some i ∈ N ; further, if bi = c for some c ∈ C, i ∈ N , then c is the winner in
b+ aP .
(2) G has a PNE where cj wins if and only if (⊥, . . . ,⊥) is a PNE of G.
(3) If k > j then G has a PNE where ck wins if and only if there are at least
M(aP )+1−sc(ck, a
P ) lazy voters who prefer ck to all candidates in (W (aP )∪
H+(aP )) \ {ck}.
(4) If k < j then G has a PNE where ck wins if and only if there are at least
M(aP ) − sc(ck, aP ) lazy voters who prefer ck to all candidates in (W (aP ) ∪
H+(aP )) \ {ck}.
Corollary 4. The problems (L, RL)-EXISTNEP , (L, RL)-TIENEP , and (L, RL)-
SINGLENEP are in P.
Principled + Lazy Voters, Randomized Tie-breaking
We will now consider the effect of the presence of principled voters on lazy voters
under randomized tie-breaking. We show that single-winner PNE in this setting may
have a more complicated structure than single-winner PNE in the absence of principled
voters. On the other hand, PNE where several candidates are tied for winning are very
similar to those that arise when no principled voters are present. We first consider the
random candidate tie-breaking rule.
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Proposition 7. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be the lazy voters’ utility profile over C, |C| =
m, and let aP = (an+1, . . . , an+s) be the principled voters’ ballot profile. The game
G = (L, RC ,u, aP ) admits a PNE b with W (b+ aP ) = {cj} for some cj ∈ C if and
only if one of the following conditions holds:
(1) W (aP ) = {cj}, H(aP ) = ∅;
(2) |Vj | ≥ M(aP ) + 1 − sc(cj , aP ), where Vj is the set that consists of all voters
i ∈ N such that (a) ui(cj) > ui(ck) for all ck ∈ W (aP ) and (b) for each
cℓ ∈ H(aP ) it holds that
ui(cj) ≥
1
|W (aP ) + 1|
∑
c∈W (aP )∪{cℓ}
ui(c).
Moreover, if condition (1) holds then G has a PNE where all lazy voters abstain, and
if condition (2) holds then G has a PNE where exactly M(aP ) + 1 − sc(cj , aP ) lazy
voters vote for cj , while the remaining lazy voters abstain. The game G has no other
PNE with winning set {cj}.
Corollary 5. The problem (L, RC)-SINGLENEP is in P.
Proposition 8. Let u = (u1, . . . , un) be the lazy voters’ utility profile over a candidate
setC, |C| = m, and let aP = (an+1, . . . , an+s) be the principled voters’ ballot profile.
Then the game G = (L, RC ,u, aP ) admits a PNE b with |W (b + aP )| > 1 if and
only if one of the following conditions holds:
(1) each candidate is ranked first by at most one voter inN∪P and 1
n+s
∑
i∈N∪P uℓ(ai) ≥
maxi∈(N∪P )\{ℓ} uℓ(ai) for all ℓ ∈ N .
(2) there exists a set of candidatesX = {cℓ1 , . . . , cℓk} with k ≥ 2, a positive integer
n′ ≤ n with n′/k ≥ 2 such that for each c 6∈ X we have sc(c, aP ) < n′/k, and
a partition of the lazy voters into k groups N1, . . . , Nk (some of which may be
empty) such that
(a) for each j ∈ [k] we have |Nj |+ sc(cℓj , aP ) = n′/k;
(b) for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj we have cℓj ≻i c for all c ∈ X \ {cℓj};
(c) for each j ∈ [k] and each i ∈ Nj we have 1k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥ maxc∈X\{cℓj} ui(c);
(d) for each j ∈ [k], each i ∈ Nj , and each c′ ∈ C \ X with sc(c′, aP ) =
n′/k − 1 we have 1
k
∑
c∈X ui(c) ≥
1
k
∑
c∈(X∪{c′})\{cℓj}
ui(c).
Moreover, if condition (1) holds then G has a PNE where each lazy voter votes for her
top candidate, and if condition (2) holds, thenG has a PNE where each lazy voter votes
for her top candidate in X . The game G has no other PNE with two or more winners.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Corollary 2 and the fact that the
model with no principled voters is a special case of the model with principled voters.
Corollary 6. The problems (L, RC)-TIENEP and (L, RC)-EXISTNEP are NP-complete.
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The reader may have noticed that Proposition 7, Corollary 5, and Proposition 8 are
stated for RC , but not for RV . The reason for this is that in the presence of principled
voters the tie-breaking rules RC and RV are no longer equivalent.
Example 5. Consider an election over the candidate set C = {c1, c2, c3}, where there
are two lazy voters whose utility function is given by u(c1) = 20, u(c2) = 4, u(c3) =
1, two lazy voters whose utility function is given by u′(c1) = 20, u′(c2) = 4, u′(c3) =
1, and one principled voter who ranks the candidates as c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2. It is easy to
see that both for RC and for RV the resulting game has a PNE where two lazy voters
vote for c1, two lazy voters vote for c2, and the principled voter votes for c3. Under
RC candidates c1 and c2 are equally likely to win in this PNE. However, under RV
candidate c1 wins with probability 3/5 and candidate c2 wins with probability 2/5.
Nevertheless, all results in this section can be extended to random voter tie-breaking,
by replacing the uniform lotteries over the winning sets in Propositions 7 and 8 by lot-
teries that correspond to choosing an element of the winning set according to the pref-
erences of a random voter (who may be principled or lazy). While the inequalities that
one needs to verify become more cumbersome, the complexity of the respective com-
putational problems remains the same. In particular, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7. The problems (L, RV )-TIENEP and (L, RV )-EXISTNEP are NP-complete,
whereas (L, RV )-SINGLENEP is in P.
Principled + Truth-biased Voters
Principled and truth-biased voters are quite similar in their behavior; therefore, adding
principled voters to the setting of Section 4 results in fewer changes than adding them
to the setting of Section 3.
To illustrate this point, we will now show how to extend Proposition 3 to settings
where principled voters may be present.
Proposition 9. Let u be the utility profile of truth-biased voters, let a be their truthful
ballot vector, and let aP be the ballot vector of principled voters. Let j = min{r |
cr ∈ W (a + aP )}. Then a is a PNE of (T , RL,u, aP ) if and only if neither of the
following conditions holds:
(1) |W (a + aP )| > 1, and there exists a candidate ck ∈ W (a + aP ) and a voter
i ∈ N such that ai 6= ck and ck ≻i cj .
(2) H(a+aP ) 6= ∅, and there exists a candidate ck ∈ H(a+aP ) and a voter i ∈ N
such that ai 6= ck, ck ≻i cj , and k < j.
All other claims in Section 4 can be modified in a similar way: essentially, we
replace W (b), H(b) and H ′(b) with W (b + aP ), H(b+ aP ) and H ′(b + aP ), but
when considering the voters’ incentives to change their votes, we limit our attention
to truth-biased voters. Of course, we have to take into account the number of votes
cast by principled voters in favor of each candidate in the winning set, and distinguish
betweenRV andRC (as we did above). Finally, it is immediate that all hardness results
established in Section 4 remain true in the presence of principled voters.
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